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Market orientation of the Swedish pork sector  
– the case of the demutualization of Swedish Meats 
Abstract 
In 2007, the largest slaughterhouse in Sweden, the farmer cooperative Swedish Meats, 
demutualized. That was the end of cooperative dominance in the Swedish meat 
industry. Paper VI claims that Swedish Meats  demutualized  because  members no 
longer perceived the benefits from dealing with the cooperative to exceed the costs. 
This was possibly due to decreased market transaction costs (external transaction 
costs) and increased internal transaction costs, e.g. agency costs, caused by the 
problems of Vaguely Defined Property Rights (VDPR). This thesis explores why 
the demutualization came about following the hypothesis that lack of market 
orientation caused lower  profitability and poorer  member benefits. Market 
orientation is analyzed using one external and one internal perspective. The external 
perspective reflects that market orientation requires correct market intelligence 
regarding consumer needs and correct market signals to the upstream actors. This 
perspective is discussed using the results from Paper I, II and III in this thesis. Paper 
I shows that even though pork is an overall low involvement product, branded pork 
has more involved consumers enabling producers to apply a differentiating strategy. 
It is indicated that Swedish Meats was successful in communicating that consumers 
should buy Swedish meat. The potential of differentiating the supply of pork with 
the help of branding also enabled suppliers to overcome difficulties associated with 
situational factors, which influence consumer choice. Paper II provides a comparison 
between results regarding consumers’ purchasing decisions studied at the Point-of-
Purchase versus in other settings. As the supermarket category manager is the gate-
keeper to the pork consumer, the supplier market orientation is dependent on the 
category manager’s decision-making. This is  discussed in Paper III. The market 
intelligence collected from the consumer and retailer has to be considered when the 
cooperative members make strategic decisions regarding product development and 
marketing. This internal perspective of market orientation is discussed using the 
results from paper IV, which indicates that the problems of VDPR aggravated the 
cooperative’s ability to respond to the market conditions. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
Corporate adaptation to consumer needs and preferences is a condition for 
successful business conduct. Market orientation is defined as 
“organizationwide generation, dissemination and responsiveness to market 
intelligence” (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990, p. 6). Grunert et al. (2005) expand 
this definition by stating that the market orientation of a value chain is the 
chain members’ generation of intelligence regarding current and future end-
users’ needs, the dissemination of this intelligence to the other members of 
the chain and the chain’s responsiveness to it. Having insufficient market 
orientation will preclude sustainable development of the firm due to the 
failure of products developed to fulfill the perceived needs of consumers 
(Narver and Slater, 1990). The profitability of the firm will deteriorate, as 
consumers will not have the opportunity to turn to new or improved 
products when the current products of the firm enter the decline stage of 
their lifecycle.  
In order to succeed in adapting to consumer demand, firms must 
continuously learn and find solutions to the expressed and latent needs of 
their target customers and communicate these solutions efficiently (Narver 
et al., 2004). Successful product development and customer communication 
require market information. The collection of market intelligence does not 
have to be evenly undertaken in the value chain, but all parties have to be 
involved in market intelligence dissemination (Grunert et al., 2005). 
Otherwise, it is reasonable to expect that the intelligence will be generated 
predominantly by the downstream actors and the responsiveness will mostly 
concern the upstream producers. The market signals have to reach the 
upstream producer and the producer must interpret them correctly,   10 
enabling the development of efficient marketing and competitive strategies 
(Slater and Narver, 1994; Day, 1994).  
Firms operating in the early stages of a supply chain need the market 
signals to be transferred through actors later in the chain. A firm will focus 
on its immediate customers but must make use of market intelligence from 
other chain actors. As these actors filter the information, it is altered and 
diminished before reaching the firms earlier in the chain (Hernàndez-
Espallardo and Arcas-Lario, 2003). This delays market adaptation and 
decreases the competitiveness of the whole chain (Grunert et al., 2005). 
The alteration of information can be intentional or unintentional. 
Opportunism can cause actors in the chain to alter the information flow to 
work for their best interests. For instance, due to the information 
asymmetry of consumer demand, the retailer can act opportunistically 
towards the producer (Wathne and Heide, 2000). This problem is 
becoming more important as production-related competencies are 
increasingly being supplemented by market-related competences. This is 
due to increased customer segmentation and increasing risks related to 
product development (Grunert et al., 2005). These aspects highlight the 
importance of correct and sufficient market information flowing in the 
supply chain. 
In the supply chain for pork, the market intelligence needs to be 
disseminated to farmers. This is primarily because they are the producers of 
the raw product, but also because they have traditionally owned the main 
slaughterhouses and processing firms in the form of cooperatives. 
Cooperatives have an important role in the market, as they represent a 
yardstick for the competition (Sexton, 1986). The existence of a 
cooperative thus decreases the information asymmetry and results in farmers 
not being subjected to opportunistic pricing from the actors downstream in 
the processing chain. In Sweden, Swedish Meats had the role of competitive 
yardstick until 2007, when this slaughter and processing cooperative was 
sold to the Finnish HK Ruokatalo. Swedish Meats had been the dominant 
actor in the Swedish slaughter industry, accounting for 77% of pigs 
slaughtered in 2000 and 71% in 2006 (KCF, 2008). The slaughter industry 
is the first of the agricultural industries traditionally dominated by farmer 
cooperatives to have abandoned the cooperative ownership structure, thus 
allowing the competitive yardstick to disappear from the market. The risk is 
that farmers will receive lower prices for their products in the future, 
causing Swedish animal rearing and the supply of meat of Swedish origin to 
decline. This change in the slaughter industry also sets a precedent for other 
industries, e.g. dairy and grain production. Therefore, studying the recent   11 
transformation of the slaughter industry can provide valuable lessons 
regarding the challenges posed by market orientation to the cooperative 
ownership structure as the competition increases. Such challenges include 
having to balance different stakeholder interests, e.g. consumers and owners.  
1.2  Aim of the thesis 
As the demutualization of Swedish Meats had extensive influences on the 
Swedish meat market, it is important to explore the driving forces behind 
the change in ownership. The reasons behind the demutualization can also 
provide important lessons for the other agriculture markets dominated by 
cooperatives. Thus, the demutualization of the Swedish Meats cooperative is 
the focal point of this thesis, which investigates why this change of 
ownership came about. The apparent answer to that question is that the 
cooperative was no longer perceived to bring sufficiently large benefits to its 
members. One of several conceivable reasons behind the demutualization of 
Swedish Meats was that the turbulent market conditions caused failing 
market orientation (Edwards and Shultz, 2005).  
Thus, the aim of this thesis was to explore the reasons for this lack of market 
orientation. This question can be tackled from two perspectives – an external 
and an internal perspective.  
1.3  The external and internal perspective of market orientation 
The  external perspective  reflects the fact that market orientation requires 
correct market information. In this study, the market of interest was the 
consumer market for fresh pork, not the restaurant market. The 
organization needs to generate marketing intelligence (Kohli and Jaworski, 
1990). Thus, one explanation for the lack of adaptation can be that the 
cooperative did not receive the necessary market information. This could 
have been either because the cooperative did not have the correct 
information about consumer needs and wants, i.e. consumer attitudes 
towards the products were not as the cooperative anticipated, or it did not 
receive the correct signals. Furthermore, the cooperative might not have 
been able to fulfill the needs and wants of the retailer, the customer closest 
to the organization and the gate-keeper to the end-consumers. These 
aspects would be the external explanation for the problem.  
In order to be adaptive to consumer and retail demand, the organization 
needs to make strategic decisions that match this demand. The organization 
must disseminate and have a responsiveness to the market intelligence   12 
received (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990). The owners and managers need to 
adjust the organization’s strategies to suit the perceived needs of the 
consumers. The internal explanation for the problem of market orientation is 
when managers and owners fail to do this.  
This thesis uses the external and the internal perspective of consumer adaptation 
to explain why the Swedish Meats cooperative was demutualized. This question is 
answered using the results from Papers I-IV. The external perspective is 
investigated through a presentation of consumer reasoning regarding 
differently labeled cut pork using the Means-End Chain approach (Papers I 
and II) and a literature review of aspects important to retail store category 
managers when accepting products for display in their stores (Paper III). 
The Means-End Chain approach is suitable as it gives insights into buying 
motives, while linking these motives to the buying behavior. Important 
product attributes, as well as the consequences achieved and values fulfilled 
through product choice, provide a deeper explanation of the motives. 
Furthermore, collecting the data in the actual decision-making situation 
allows elucidation of the actual motivational structure underpinning 
consumer choice.  
Consumer choice is also determined by the assortment decisions made 
by the retailer. Thus, the decision-making of retail store category managers 
is investigated through a literature review of retail decision-making (Paper 
III). Identifying the factors that determine retail product choice provides an 
understanding of the demands producers have to meet to get their products 
accepted and sold in retail stores. Paper III focuses on the demands facing 
smaller, local suppliers, but as larger producers such as Swedish Meats face the 
same retail store decision-makers, they are subject to the same demand. 
Small and large suppliers both have to be accepted by the retail store 
category manager to be sold in the store. Together with intelligence on the 
end-consumer, knowledge of grocery store category manager decision-
making comprises market intelligence that has to be disseminated in the 
supply chain and responded to by producers, e.g. Swedish Meats. 
The responsiveness of Swedish Meats  is examined by taking a New 
Institutional approach. The New Institutional  Economics (NIE) assumes 
that individuals are bounded rational and acting self-interest seeking 
(Williamson, 1989). The internal perspective is explored using Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) and the problems of Vaguely Defined Property 
Rights (VDPR). As this approach enables a visualization of the complete set 
of costs experienced by individuals when using a market institution, it is 
suitable in explaining why certain organizational institutions are chosen and 
others abandoned. Using the TCE framework in combination with the   13 
problems of VDPR also provides an explanation for why  a certain 
organizational structure does not succeed in delivering the desired results. 
This theoretical framework is used to analyze interviews conducted with 
key stakeholders in the decision to sell off the Swedish Meats cooperative 
(Paper IV). From the interviews with the key stakeholders, the chosen 
theoretical framework enables an analysis of how well the external 
perspective was taken into account in the strategic decision-making.  
In order to fulfill the aim of the thesis, i.e. to explore the reason for lack of 
market orientation within Swedish Meats, the following key questions had to be 
answered: 1) What implications did consumer attitudes to differently labeled 
pork have for the market orientation and profitability of Swedish Meats? 2) 
What implications did the situational context of the consumer purchasing 
decision have for the market orientation and profitability of Swedish Meats? 
3) What implications did the demands of the retail category manager have 
for the market orientation and profitability of Swedish Meats? 4) How did 
Swedish Meats fail to be responsive to market intelligence, and why? 
   14 
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2  Theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
2.1  Cooperatives 
The demutualization of Swedish Meats saw the end of an era of cooperative 
domination in the slaughter industry in Sweden. It has been shown that 
waves of cooperative demutualization come after dramatic institutional 
changes or market changes leading to increased competition (Chaddad and 
Cook, 2004b; Chaddad and Cook, 2007; Fulton and Hueth, 2009). 
Through increased competition, the reason for the existence of  the 
cooperative, counteracting market failure, becomes weaker. Cooperatives 
have traditionally been the dominant organizations in most agricultural 
industries, partly due to the characteristics of agricultural products.  
There is often a long and complex chain between the raw product and 
the final consumer product (Ritson, 1997). That might give rise to 
opportunism towards farmers, especially since agricultural products are 
perishable. The farmers might end up in hold-up situations where 
information asymmetry enhances the advantage of the downstream actors.  
When a cooperative exists, this opportunistic behavior is reduced, as the 
cooperative has a competitive yardstick effect (Sexton, 1986).  
In addition, agricultural products are bulky commodities, costly  to 
transport and in need of processing, creating possibilities to attain economies 
of scale when undertaking these activities (Padberg, 1997). Hence, it is 
beneficial for farmers to use cooperatives as the marketing channels for their 
products.  
A cooperative business is owned and controlled by its users. Barton 
(1989, p.1) presents the following definition: 
   16 
A cooperative is a user-owned and user-controlled business that distributes 
benefits on the basis of use. 
• Persons who own and finance the cooperative are those that use it. 
• Control of the cooperative is by those who use the cooperative. 
• Benefits of the cooperative are distributed to its users on the basis of their 
use. 
The user of a cooperative is a member of the same. The members own the 
cooperative and receive a patronage refund based on the scope of their 
transactions with the organization. In traditional cooperatives, members 
invest a small amount of equity and they are not compensated through 
dividends at all, or only to a limited extent. As the members are the residual 
claimants of the cooperative, they instead receive the residual through the 
patronage refund. The members have the responsibility for controlling the 
cooperative. 
Forming a cooperative, therefore, is not cost-free to the farmers. 
Compared with transacting through the market, they have to take on costs 
for controlling and monitoring the cooperative. Through the cooperative, 
the farmers integrate vertically in the supply chain.  
2.2  Transaction Cost Economics 
The transaction costs depend on the institution in which the transaction 
takes place (Williamson, 2000). Institutions can therefore be compared 
depending on the level of transaction costs that are experienced by the 
transacting parties. The transaction costs explain why some institutions are 
used and others not. Transaction costs are the costs of an exchange, such as 
costs for obtaining information, negotiating and monitoring or enforcing 
the deal (Hobbs, 1996).  
These costs come about due to the underlying assumptions in TCE; that 
individuals are opportunistic, have bounded rationality, operate under 
uncertainty and experience some degree of asset specificity (Williamson, 
1975). Individuals are assumed to be seeking self-interest with guile (i.e. 
opportunistic) and the information asymmetry creates uncertainty for the 
transacting parties.  
The parties in the transaction are assumed to seek to minimize the 
transaction costs, provided that the production costs are constant, and 
therefore choose the institutional solution that brings the lowest total costs. 
Williamson (1989) suggests three dimensions of transaction costs; the 
frequency at which transactions between the parties take place, the   17 
uncertainty involved in the transaction, and the asset specificity in relation 
to the transaction experienced by the parties.  
Asset specificity arises when a trading party has invested in assets that 
have little or no alternative value for other uses (Williamson, 1989). This 
can be resources in terms of site specificity, specific physical or human 
resources and assets in the form of resources dedicated to the particular 
transaction and the brand capital resource. The frequency is a source of 
transaction costs as transactions involving a higher degree of specific assets 
are more likely to be hierarchically organized if frequently occurring 
(Williamson, 1979). High frequency of transactions increases the 
opportunities to recover the relation-specific costs and also enables learning 
by doing, so the transaction costs decrease with frequency.  
High frequency decreases the uncertainty, as it enables the creation of 
specialist transaction structures for which the trading partners strive to retain 
the costs. The uncertainty facing the exchanging parties can be divided into 
primary uncertainty (stemming from random acts of nature and unforeseen 
changes in consumer preferences), secondary uncertainty (arising from lack 
of communication) and behavioral uncertainty (strategic nondisclosure and 
distortion of information) (Williamson, 1989). Different institutional 
solutions can therefore be evaluated depending on the cost of information, 
negotiation and monitoring of the dimensions of frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity.  
Farming activities and the food supply chain are characterized by high 
asset specificity (Roumasset, 1995; Allen and Lueck, 1998). The  location of 
farms cannot be changed and the equipment for farming activities has no 
alternative use, creating physical asset specificity. The same features exist for 
the processing link of the supply chain. Investing in slaughter equipment or 
dairy machinery imposes asset specificity for the processor as well. Thus, for 
the parties to find it cost-efficient to make the investment, they need to 
ensure that the transaction between the two takes place. The farmers will 
not invest in farming equipment if there are very high transaction costs 
involved in selling the farm products and the processor will not invest in 
machinery for processing without being sure of acquiring sufficient products 
to process. Hence, vertical integration will create the lowest transaction 
costs for the parties. The high frequency of transactions recovers the 
relation-specific investments and the uncertainty facing the parties 
diminishes. The vertical integration stops at the transaction in the supply 
chain where the cost of using an alternative institution is lower. In the case 
of  Swedish Meats, that was when selling the processed product to the 
retailer. The Swedish Meats cooperative could be regarded as an extension of   18 
the members’ farms (Feng, 2010). The farmers were the owners of the 
slaughter and processing plant and had to make strategic decisions regarding 
its operations. Hence, the farmers took on other costs - governance costs. 
Accompanying the cooperative organizational structure are costs associated 
with the distribution of property rights of members, such as agency costs. 
The ownership of an organization should be assigned to the patron that 
minimizes the transaction costs for all patrons in the organization 
(Hansmann, 1988). The cost of ownership arises due to owners having to 
stay informed, to communicate and to bring the decision to bear on the 
organization’s management. Poor management of the members will result 
in the managers exploiting them and organizational slack will result in 
wasted earnings. Cooperatives bring lower transaction costs when there is 
malfunctioning market competition. In that case, members are the patrons 
minimizing the total cost of ownership. In general, the patron owning an 
organization should be the patron experiencing the lowest ownership or 
monitoring costs. However, if some patron group experiences high market 
transaction costs, this group will still be the most efficient owner as the 
group through its ownership will experience lower transaction costs. 
Hence, the total cost to the patron group will be reduced even though the 
cost of ownership is rather high.  
Ownership consists of two elements, the exercise of control and the 
receipt of compensation in the form of residual earnings (Hansmann, 1988). 
The cost of ownership, or exercising control, is small if there are few 
owners, living in the neighborhood and transacting regularly. The cost of 
ownership increases if the owners have diverging interests, as not all of the 
owners’ interests can be met. Hence, sub-groups achieving disproportionate 
influence can emerge. This is likely to happen if some group of owners can 
more easily participate in the decision-making than others, e.g. by being 
knowledgeable.  
The cost associated with the second element of ownership, the residual 
earnings, is foremost the cost of bearing the risk of the organization 
(Hansmann, 1988). There is usually some group of patrons that can bear 
this cost to a lower cost than others, for example due to diversification. 
Thus, this group of patrons should be the owners. This is the usual 
argument for IOFs. In IOFs, the patrons with the lowest risk-bearing costs 
are the owners of the firm. The risk-bearing costs can be problematic in a 
cooperative, as the members invest in activities that are extensions of their 
farm activities, resulting in low diversification and high risk-bearing costs. 
In addition, liquidity problems can prevent patrons from providing the 
necessary risk capital, as the cooperative members prefer to invest in their   19 
own farms. However, as the cooperative members perceive that the costs of 
ownership are lower than the benefits from reduced transaction costs, they 
will still be assigned the ownership as they are the patrons that minimize the 
sum of costs for all patrons. Thus, the cost of ownership, e.g. the agency 
costs and other monitoring costs that occur due to the cooperative’s 
VDPR, is acceptable to the members. 
2.3  Property rights and the problems of Vaguely Defined 
Property Rights 
When the residual control and the residual rights are aligned, there are no 
problems regarding the property rights of an asset. When ownership is 
separated from control, agency costs emerge (Bager, 1996). The separation 
of ownership and control results in the need for contracts between principal 
and agent to ensure that the interests of the agent are in accordance with 
those of the principal. In cooperatives, the members are the principals and 
the management is the agent. As these contracts are imperfect, they give rise 
to problems of VDPR. 
In cooperatives, problems of VDPR can be severe. Firstly, this is because 
the cooperative residual claim is not openly tradable (Nilsson, 2001). 
Secondly, the members have no individual ownership rights to the 
cooperative, only to their individual share in the cooperative society. This 
share is not appreciable and all decisions regarding the equity are made 
collectively, usually by equal voting power. Thirdly, the existence of 
unallocated equity enhances the collectivism in the decision-making. The 
result is that the members scarcely have any individual property rights to the 
cooperative, which creates problems of VDPR.  
Furthermore, the members receive the cooperative’s profits as patronage 
refund and improved terms of trade (Nilsson, 2001). No market signal 
reflected in the price of the share reaches members and management when 
they assess the performance of the cooperative. As the members lack the 
market signal from their shares  to help in evaluating the manager, the 
agency problems are more severe than in an IOF. The problems of VDPR 
are the free-rider, the horizon, the portfolio, the control and the influence 
cost problems (Cook, 1995). 
As all members gain the benefits of the cooperative’s aggregated assets, 
accumulated through time, new members will be free-riding on the efforts of 
the old. The unallocated capital makes it possible for members to reap 
benefits without contributing accordingly (Cook, 1995). Due to the 
possibility to free-ride, members do not like to invest in the cooperative.   20 
Members do not get any part of the unallocated capital when leaving the 
cooperative.  
Because of the unallocated capital, a horizon problem exists as well. As 
members have different time horizons, they are unwilling to make long-
term investments (Cook, 1995). Members will oppose  investments that 
bring benefits after the member leaves the cooperative.  
The lack of tradability, liquidity and appreciation of the residual claims 
also causes the portfolio problem (Cook, 1995). When having no other ties to 
a business than the equity investment, the owner can create a portfolio that 
matches the risk preferences (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). Cooperative 
members are tied to the cooperative because of their  patron role. The 
cooperative can be regarded as an extension of the farm. The farmers’ risk 
preferences will therefore have to be met by diversification of operations 
within the cooperative. As the members are a heterogeneous group, the 
cooperative will only be able to meet the preference of the average 
members or some specific group of members. The composition of the 
portfolio can create a conflict between the principal (the members) and the 
agent (the manager) (Nilsson, 2001).  
The agent has to be controlled and monitored by the principal. In a 
cooperative, a control problem  arises as no information regarding the 
performance of the agent is provided through the stock market (Cook, 
1995). Hence, a cooperative has to undertake monitoring and controlling 
without this evaluation instrument. The agent has greater opportunities to 
act opportunistically. The information asymmetry and the agent’s and the 
principal’s diverging interests bring problems for the monitoring of the 
cooperative. 
In addition, the heterogeneity among cooperative members may lead to 
some groups acting to promote their interests at the expense of other 
members (Cook, 1995). This causes an influence cost problem.  
2.4  Cooperatives and market orientation 
Market orientation can be seen as “the extent to which an actor in the 
marketplace uses knowledge about the market, especially about customers, 
as a basis for decision-making on what to produce, how to produce it, and 
how to market it” (Grunert et al., 2005 p. 428). Actors in a value chain 
interact to create value added to the end-user. In order to be successful, 
market intelligence from all actors in the chain needs to be used, not just 
market intelligence related to the immediate customers in the chain. The 
downstream actors, however, need to include more market intelligence in   21 
their decision-making. The actors upstream have to use this intelligence to 
adapt the product to end-user needs. The more differentiated the group of 
end-users or raw products, the more intelligence is needed downstream for 
adjusting the product to end-user needs. To enhance dissemination of 
market intelligence, the links between the actors should be short and strong. 
There also needs to be a power balance between them, enabling trust and 
commitment. In addition, a strong trade association, contributing to the 
dissemination of market intelligence, contributes to the process. The trust 
and commitment generated in these value chains create an openness that 
increases the market intelligence flow in the value chain and reduces hold-
up problems that can otherwise prevent upstream actors from engaging in 
differentiation activities requiring segregation and traceability (Grunert et 
al., 2005). The trust and commitment determine the degree of market 
orientation of the chain.  
Cooperatives are good at providing standardized and homogeneous 
products due to the principle of equal treatment (Grunert et al., 2005) and 
trust (Søgaard, 1994). They are regarded as being less well suited to 
providing differentiated products in response to consumer needs. 
Traditional cooperatives are suitable when operating on a commodity 
market where economies of scale can be attained and members and 
products are homogeneous (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007), i.e. when cost 
leadership is the preferred competitive strategy (Porter, 2004). Under these 
conditions the VDPR problems become less severe as investments are small, 
the member interest more aligned and all members benefit from new 
members free-riding on previous members’ efforts, as economies of scale 
bring larger benefits when the membership increases (Nilsson, 2001).  
Problems can arise as the cooperative moves to more value-added 
activities that require more capital and market intelligence. The board’s 
decisions tend to be more production-orientated than market-orientated 
(Staatz, 1984). There is also a tendency to avoid risky operations (Nilsson, 
1998; Hendrikse, 1998). Thus, as cooperatives increasingly have to operate 
on value-added markets undertaking product processing and branding, 
cooperative structures other than the traditional form may be considered 
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004a). Following a differentiation or focus strategy 
makes more entrepreneurial cooperative structures efficient (Nilsson and 
Ohlsson, 2007). More risk capital is needed for these strategies.  
Modifying the cooperative structure decreases the monitoring costs of 
members, as the property rights become more clearly defined. For instance, 
tradable and appreciable delivery rights decrease the horizon problem, as 
retiring members have a chance to  get their investments back (Nilsson,   22 
2001). As transferable, appreciable equity shares are introduced along with 
defined memberships, legally binding contracts and sizeable up-front equity 
investments, the VDPR problems diminish (Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999). 
Cooperative conversions occur when member control is ineffective 
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004b; Chaddad and Cook, 2007; Fulton and Hueth, 
2009). 
Market-orientated activities, such as branding, require long-term 
investments in marketing and product development (Hardesty, 2005). Hanf 
and Kühl (2005) regard branding as critical for the success of food 
manufacturers. As consumers have a positive attitude towards cooperatives, 
this can be used in the branding process, possibly together with some other 
attributes, such as locally produced (Nilsson et al., 2007). In addition, as a 
cooperative controls all the steps in production, it has a good opportunity to 
provide traceability and ensure the safety of the products. This is important 
to retailers as well as consumers (Skytte and Blunch, 2001).  
Traditionally, agribusiness has been slow to develop brands and has 
instead relied on government protection, improved efficiency or reduced 
buyer power (Beverland, 2007). The future will demand strong brands, 
close relationships along the supply chain, market orientation and unique 
selling propositions. Traditional cooperatives seem to fail in these respects, 
while alternative cooperative structures have been found to be more 
successful (Zeuli, 1998). It has been found that cooperatives can charge 
value-added prices, but that the long-term viability of this strategy depends 
on the cooperative structure (Beverland, 2007). Long-term branding success 
has been found to demand alternative cooperative structures enabling more 
clearly defined property rights. This is because traditional cooperatives have 
difficulties maintaining member commitment to the value-adding strategy 
(Nilsson et al., 2009).  
It has been shown that market orientation is positively associated with 
performance in countries with a culture distinguished by low power 
distance and low uncertainty avoidance (Kirca et al., 2005), e.g. Sweden 
(Hofstede, 1983). Introducing individual ownership improves the 
performance of cooperatives, while cooperatives using differential pricing 
policies strengthen their market orientation (Kyriakopoulos, 2000; 
Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004). In order for a cooperative to be successful in 
market orientation, an entrepreneurial firm culture is important. This is 
supported by McClure (2010), who found that bureaucratic structures are 
not effective to maintain a market-orientated strategy, but rather stable 
markets. Instead, culture explained the good market orientation. Internal 
processes influence market orientation performance more than   23 
organizational structures (Kirca et al., 2005). The results of market 
orientation are affected through innovativeness, customer loyalty and 
quality. Thus, incentive systems in organizations need to emphasize and ease 
processes leading to innovation, such as interconnection between 
departments.  
As cooperatives have to rely on internal capital sources, the innovation 
capability is reduced (Holmström, 1999). The lack of price signals provided 
by the stock markets and the lack of active investors hamper cooperative 
development. Thus, members’ voices  have to be used to improve the 
performance. The tensions among members increase as the competition 
intensifies. The divergence in interests and preferences of members cause 
the voice instrument to become more costly to use. Hence, exit becomes a 
more attractive alternative, partly because the deregulation opens up other 
trading options for the farmers.  
Changes in the market structure and technology open the way and make 
it necessary for organizations to be innovative (Holmström, 1999). 
Cooperatives have a disadvantage in this, as the members will have different 
opinions on which innovations to pursue. Evaluating innovations becomes 
more difficult as there is no capital market help in this assessment, e.g. no 
stock value increase when the organization undertakes profitable or 
promising innovative processes. As external investors do not have any 
influence in the cooperative firm due to the principle of user control, they 
have no interest in providing the risk capital needed. The cooperatives do 
not have to be innovative in a regulated market and therefore they do not 
have measures available for evaluating and rewarding innovative activities, 
resulting in the management lacking guidance for such activities. The 
activities should be directed towards fulfilling the needs of consumers. Thus, 
good market intelligence is needed in order to assess and discover 
innovations and market opportunities.  
2.5  Means-End Chain 
The consumer reasoning related to a firm’s offered products can be derived 
using the Means-End Chain model (MEC). MEC is a theoretical construct 
whereby consumer values are connected to their behavior, thereby 
revealing how products derive personal value. The aim of the model is to 
create an excerpt from the consumer’s cognitive or motivational decision 
structure (Grunert and Grunert, 1995). 
According to Gutman (1982), the MEC model is based on two main 
assumptions; values are central to consumer decisions, and consumers   24 
reduce the complexity of the environment through creating categories. This 
categorization is done according to stimuli that are linked to desired end-
goals. The categorization results in different products being chosen for 
further consideration and the categorization process will continue until only 
one product remains. The products considered are the evoked set and they 
have the attributes that are believed to have consequences leading to desired 
values. The consequences can be direct, indirect, physiological, 
psychological or sociological, and consumers act in ways to maximize the 
positive consequences and minimize the negative. Consumers learn which 
attribute leads to specific consequences, as well as the more important value 
that the consequences result in. The more important the value the 
consequence results in, the more important the attribute associated with 
that consequence will be to the consumer. Figure 1 shows the basic 
relationships within the MEC paradigm.  
Attributes
- Concrete
-Abstract
Consequences
- Functional
- Psychosocial
Values
- Instrumental
-Terminal
 
Figure 1. Means-End Chain model (after Olson, 1989, p. 174). 
According to Olson (1989), all consumers may not have complete MECs. 
They may have different product knowledge at different levels of 
abstraction. This comes about when consumers are naïve and have little 
product experience or when the product is very simple.  
Costa et al. (2004) state that food products are often rich in abstract 
attributes and consequences. This is due to the habitual behavior associated 
with the choice of food items and meals, making it difficult for the 
respondents to connect their actions to their values. Other explanations for 
the richness of attributes and consequences are the lack of expert knowledge 
in food, which makes it difficult to envisage what consequences food 
attributes actually bring.  
The respondent’s perceived product attributes, consequences and values 
form mental chains that are aggregated into a hierarchical value map (HVM). 
These chains contain product knowledge (attributes and functional 
consequences) as well as self-knowledge (psychosocial consequences and 
values) (Audenaert and Steenkamp, 1997).  With increasing consumer 
knowledge of, or involvement in, the product, a larger number of ladders 
are elicited (Gengler and Reynolds, 1995). There are structural differences 
between the HVM of high  and low involvement products. Low   25 
involvement products have simpler and less interconnected maps than high 
involvement products (Gengler et al., 1995). 
There are two views of MEC and what the HVM envisions –  a 
motivational view and a cognitive structure view. The motivational view 
sees MEC as consumers’ buying behavior motives, thereby giving a greater 
understanding of consumers’ buying behavior. According to the cognitive 
view, MEC shows the product-related knowledge stored and organized in 
the consumer’s memory and can thereby be regarded as an excerpt from the 
consumer’s cognitive structure (Grunert and Grunert, 1995). LePage et al. 
(2005) state that the least abstract levels of an MEC have the best 
predictability of behavior. Parts or all of the structure must be activated 
before it can influence the consumer’s behavior (Olson, 1989).  
When investigating consumer decision making, the researcher must 
ensure that the most important cues are present in the consumer’s mind. If 
an accurate image of the consumer’s decision-relevant cognitive structure is 
to be attained, the consumer should undertake minimal strategic processing. 
Strategic processing can be reduced through keeping the data collection 
context similar to the actual decision-making situation (Grunert and 
Grunert, 1995). The data collection method suitable for MEC is laddering 
interviews. 
2.6  Laddering interviews 
Laddering interviews are the in-depth interview technique used to derive 
the MEC chains. The main concept of laddering is to get the interviewee to 
react and respond to his or her own answers through using questions such 
as ‘Why is that important to you?’, thereby attaining consequences and 
values at higher levels of abstraction (Reynolds and Gutman, 1988). When 
the consumer no longer has a ready answer, the interview stops. The 
interviewees might wish to stop the laddering probing as they perceive it to 
be too personal. This problem can be solved through evoking a situational 
context, as interviewees feel more comfortable in answering questions that 
are linked to an actual context or event. Laddering works best when 
interviewees provide associations while thinking of a realistic occasion in 
which they would use the product.  
Laddering can be hard or soft. Soft laddering implies that the natural flow 
of interviewee answers is influenced as little as possible. This is opposed to 
hard laddering, which forces the interviewee to produce one ladder at a time 
(Grunert and Grunert, 1995). Soft laddering tends to generate categories at 
a low level of abstraction (Leppard et al., 2004).    26 
When conducting laddering interviews, only the salient criteria that are 
most important to the behavior should be retrieved. Hence, the laddering 
interview should stop when the interviewee does not know the answer. 
Otherwise, strategic processing might occur, making the interviewee think 
in a problem-solving manner, in which case the HVM does not represent a 
correct image of the cognitive structure (Grunert and Grunert, 1995).  
Strategic processing can be reduced through conducting the interviews 
in an authentic decision situation and through allowing ‘forked answers’. 
Forked answers mean that the interviewee is not forced to take one ladder 
at a time and can answer using more than one ladder, returning to a lower 
level of abstraction to elaborate another aspect of the product. When an 
excerpt of the cognitive structure is constructed, the cognitive process 
simultaneously influences this excerpt. It is thereby not possible to get a true 
image of the interviewee’s cognitive structure (Grunert and Grunert, 1995). 
It is worth noting the criticism by Bagozzi and Dabholkar (2000), who 
emphasize that consumers are not aware of their mental processes. After the 
decision is made, consumers explain their reasoning in a way perceived to 
be the anticipated. The motives for the behavior are formed as the 
consumer expresses them. However, Grunert and Grunert (1995) present 
four criteria that should be fulfilled if the researcher is to be able to measure 
the interviewee’s cognitive structure: (1) The raw data should be a result of 
the interviewee’s cognitive structures and processes rather than of the 
researcher’s cognitive structures and processes, (2) the data collection should 
not involve strategic processes not typical for the target market, (3) coding 
should preferably be based on cognitive categories widely shared among 
both consumers, researchers, and users of research results and not on the 
researcher’s idiosyncratic cognitive categories, and (4) the algorithm used for 
data reduction should be based on theory about cognitive structure and 
processes. Conducting the interviews in the actual decision-making setting, 
for example by the meat counter in the store just as the consumer has 
chosen which meat to buy, should reduce the strategic processing since the 
reasoning is fresh in the mind and the interviewee has no time to rationalize 
his/her purchasing motives.    27 
3  Approach 
3.1  Qualitative approach  
The data in this thesis were collected using a qualitative (flexible) approach. 
This approach is suitable as it provides the flexibility of study design needed 
when studying unpredictable objects, such as an individual’s behavior, 
beliefs or attitudes, and makes use of methods providing output in verbal 
format (Robson, 2002). In Papers I-IV, the researcher is the instrument of 
data collection, the focus is on the participants’ view of the studied 
phenomenon, and the studies aim at presenting multiple realities. The 
studies start with a phenomenon that the researcher tries to understand. To 
do so, different interview techniques are employed in the different studies. 
3.2  Laddering interviews at the Point-of-Purchase 
In the study on consumer attitudes towards differently labeled cut pork, soft 
laddering interviews were conducted with consumers of branded 
(Scan/Swedish Meats), unbranded (meat cut in the store), imported and 
locally/organically produced cut pork. This laddering was designed to 
derive the MEC of the interviewees, to be aggregated into HVMs. One 
HVM was produced per type of meat studied. In total, 127 interviews were 
conducted, 30-34 for each type of pork. 
Soft laddering was chosen because the study topic is fairly uncomplicated 
due to food purchasing choices being categorized by low involvement 
(Costa et al., 2004). Soft laddering thereby results in the interviewer bias 
becoming smaller due to less complicated interpretation of the ladders 
(Grunert and Grunert, 1995). On the other hand, with a less complex 
subject hard laddering could be advantageous, since it provides the   28 
interviewee with more characteristics than would otherwise have come to 
mind (Russell et al., 2004). Russell et al. (2004) also claim that soft 
laddering results in more categories than hard laddering. Our motivational 
approach made it more interesting to derive a larger number of categories 
and get the consumer to recollect the associations, rather than recognizing 
them from an a priori list. This is because the purpose of the study was to 
provide as elaborate a view of consumer reasoning as possible. HVM 
created from soft laddering data are more complicated than HVM from hard 
laddering, but can provide more information. Russell et al. (2004) also 
recommend that soft laddering be used when the aim of the study is to 
broaden the picture of the participants’ beliefs, which was the case in this 
study. Soft laddering has a tendency to generate connections at lower 
abstraction levels (Leppard et al., 2004), which needs to be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the HVM. 
The interview used the type of pork chosen as the object of the 
interview. Direct elicitation was used. According to Bech-Larsen and 
Nielsen (1999), direct elicitation is the recommended technique when the 
aim of the study is to explore how the consumers are reasoning, rather than 
predict their choice or replicate their cognitive structure. Before the 
interviews, the interviewees were told that there were no right and wrong 
answers and that the questions might seem obvious and silly, but this was 
part of the method. This information was given in order to make the 
interviewees feel more at ease during the interview and to create some 
vulnerability on the part of the interviewer, hopefully making the 
interviewee speak more freely (Reynolds and Gutman, 1988). The 
interviewer tried to influence the interviewees’ answers as little as possible. 
3.3   Literature review of retail store category managers’ 
purchasing decisions 
In order to identify the factors influencing retailer category managers’ 
purchasing decisions, models explaining the retailers’ purchasing behavior in 
general were identified. As the literature in this area is limited, the literature 
review had to include findings in product categories other than food and on 
decision-making models at the central retail level. The literature review was 
conducted continuously from fall 2009 to spring 2011. 
From the models of purchasing behavior reviewed, the most important 
aspects were identified, such as the assortment strategy, the product and 
supplier characteristics and the information used in the decision-making. 
The models also showed the need to include the personal characteristics of   29 
the decision-maker when studying the decision-making process. A 
thorough literature search was then conducted to identify as many 
influential factors as possible in order to apply them to the decision of 
accepting a perishable product such as cut pork to be sold in the retail store. 
3.4  Interviews with key stakeholders of Swedish Meats 
In order to fulfill the aim of the study – to explain why Swedish Meats was 
demutualized – it was deemed appropriate to use a qualitative method or 
flexible study design (Robson, 2002; Anastas and MacDonald, 1994). 
Firstly, a literature review of the reasons for cooperative demutualization 
was conducted. Based on this literature review, a question guide was 
developed.  
Following the recommendation by King (1994), interviews are 
appropriate when individual historical accounts are needed about a change, 
in this case the demutualization of Swedish Meats. Due to the complex and 
sensitive nature of the questions that had to be asked, personal interviews 
were needed. Two-way communication between the interviewer and the 
interviewee was required. Thus, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted. During the interviews, the interviewees could speak freely. 
However,  to ensure that all relevant aspects identified in the literature 
review were covered, the interviewer used the question guide. The 
interviewees were allowed to study the question guide before the interview. 
The questions in the question guide were open-ended in order to enhance 
the flexibility of the interview, allow the interviewee to provide an in-
depth interpretation of the phenomenon in question, and provide him/her 
with the opportunity to produce unexpected or unanticipated answers 
(Robson, 2002).  
Before the interviews were conducted, a  general list of potential 
interviewees was constructed. Key stakeholders of Swedish Meats  were 
identified, both those who took an active part in the decision to sell the 
operational part of the organization (directors) and those who were subject 
to the decision (rank-and-file members). The stakeholders were persons 
raising their opinion either against or for the sell-off in the public debate. 
These were targeted for interview as they were perceived to be 
knowledgeable regarding the status of the organization. All interviewees had 
been members of the cooperative and pig farmers. 
The answers provided by the interviewees were continuously aggregated 
under headings summarizing different aspects of the decision process, such 
as ‘Reasons for lacking profitability’ and ‘The influence of the member   30 
representatives’. On doing this, patterns in the answers could be visualized. 
During the process, it became apparent that the interviewees were not 
providing contradictory responses. Even though the interviewees had had 
different stand-points at the time of the decision to sell the operational part 
of the organization, they all provided the same rationale as to why the 
process came about. In addition, a pattern emerged in the answers and as no 
new information was added by the sixth interview, saturation occurred 
(Robson, 2002). The pattern resulting from the interviews was then 
analyzed using the theoretical framework suggested by previous studies.  
The interviews were held over the telephone and lasted between 30 and 
75 minutes. Conducting telephone interviews results in information losses 
caused by lack of visual cues, but this can be counterbalanced by the smaller 
interviewer effect and lower tendency for socially desirable responses 
(Bradburn and Sudman, 1979). The interviewees were asked if the 
interviews could be recorded and they all agreed to this. The recordings 
were transcribed and the interviewee had the opportunity to comment on 
the transcript to ensure its validity.  
The interviews were supplemented by secondary data from the industry 
to provide the external framework for the decision to sell the operational 
part of the organization.  
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4  Results 
4.1  Paper I: ‘Consumer involvement and perceived 
differentiation of different kinds of pork – a Means-End 
Chain analysis’  
Paper I analyzed consumers’ motivational structure for imported, unbranded 
(cut in-store), branded (Scan-labeled, i.e. the brand of Swedish Meats) and 
locally/organically produced pork. The HVM derived for imported pork 
diverged as it only included one chain of reasoning. Imported pork 
consumers chose it because it was cheap, resulting in the consequence of 
them saving money to be used on other things. The simplicity of reasoning, 
i.e. the low number of chains, indicates that the consumers of this kind of 
pork have low involvement in their purchasing decision. 
The second least complicated HVM was derived from the unbranded 
pork consumers. The most important attribute determining why they chose 
the unbranded pork was that it was Swedish, but it was almost equally 
important that it was sold in a convenient size of pack. Convenient size of 
pack and the pork being cheap led to the consequences of saving money 
and time. The attribute ‘Swedish’ was perceived to ensure good handling of 
the animals and no diseases in the meat. This resulted in the consumers 
staying healthy and the value of security. A third group of attributes related 
to the appearance of the pork and the taste, leading to the consequence of 
good taste, ending in the hedonistic value of enjoying the food. 
Consumers who chose locally/organically or branded pork showed a 
higher level of involvement. A range of attributes were important for the 
consumers of locally/organically produced pork. Some bought this pork 
because it was locally produced and they wanted to favor Swedish farmers. 
Others bought it because it was the first one they came across and thereby   32 
saved them time. Still others chose the pork because of the convenient size 
of pack, because it saved them money and gave no leftovers. Another group 
chose it because it was the right type of meat and had an attractive 
appearance. Again, this was perceived to lead to good taste and end in the 
hedonistic value of enjoying the food. The most important attribute was 
that the product was organically produced. This attribute was supported by 
the attribute of the pork being Swedish, which was perceived as ensuring 
quality. This quality was connected to the good taste of the product and 
hedonistic values, but also to caring for the animals and the universalistic 
value of animal welfare. 
Regarding the consumer choice of a branded pork product, the results 
clearly demonstrate that the most important attribute was the country of 
origin, in other words that it was Swedish. Few  interviewees mentioned 
the brand itself as  being the reason for choosing the branded pork. 
Domestic origin was primarily believed to imply good quality and health. 
Quality was associated with good taste, indicating that domestic pork was 
perceived as tastier than imported. Five values were present in the HVM for 
branded pork, the largest number of values for all HVMs. For the buyers of 
branded pork, the hedonistic value ‘Enjoy the food’ seemed to be the most 
important, followed by the universal value ‘Animal welfare’. The three 
values presented in the map sorting under Schwartz’s (1992) value 
categorization ‘Security’ seemed less important to the interviewees. 
Moreover, consumers of branded pork believed that domestic pork is 
produced in a good manner and does not entail any diseases, thus leading to 
healthiness.  
4.2  Paper II: ‘Methodological implications of conducting 
laddering interviews in a Point-of-Purchase setting’  
Paper II examined the methodological implications of conducting laddering 
interviews in a Point-of-Purchase setting. To minimize the strategic process 
when conducting laddering interviews, the data collection context needs to 
be similar to the actual decision-making situation (Grunert and Grunert, 
1995). Conducting the interviews at the Point-of-Purchase (PoP), as done 
in Paper I, was expected to achieve this. On comparing the results from 
data collection at the PoP with previous research and of data collection in a 
controlled environment, it was found that almost all concepts found in 
previous studies also appeared in the PoP study. This indicates that the data 
loss was not severe. The main difference was that the PoP study included 
practical attributes and consequences that were typical of the situational   33 
context and thereby not included in other studies. These attributes and 
consequences included convenient size of pack, the pork being the first that 
the consumer came across, being the right type of meat and saving time.  
Nylund (2009) conducted a soft laddering study of consumer perception 
of the same pork categories as in Paper I, but carried out the interviews in a 
controlled environment separate from the actual decision-making situation. 
Some concepts appearing in that study were missing in the PoP study, such 
as discussions about transportation, the demands of the family, 
environmental concerns, traceability, holding producers responsible and 
propaganda. On the other hand, the PoP study emphasized more practical 
aspects, such as good taste. Instead of environmental concerns, the PoP 
study included animal welfare. Animal welfare is easier to relate to pork 
than the environmental impact of animal husbandry. Thus, animal welfare is 
more likely to be elicited at the PoP. Overall, the PoP study generated 
categories that were less abstract than those in the study by Nylund (2009). 
The HVMs of imported pork clearly indicate the difference between the 
two interview settings. Being asked in the actual decision situation showed 
how simple the decision actually is for the consumer, whereas being asked 
later led to rationalization and elaboration of the reasoning behind the 
choice. 
The PoP study apparently resulted in less elaboration to higher 
abstraction levels and it did not encourage elaboration of all ladders. On the 
other hand, more concrete and possibly more salient concepts were elicited.    34 
4.3  Paper III: ‘How local producers get access to retail shelf 
space.  Decision-making by supermarket category managers 
related to small-scale purchases of perishable goods’  
The literature review of the purchasing behavior and the criteria important 
for getting products accepted by the retail store category manager resulted 
in a conceptual model (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Perishable purchase decision-making model for supermarket buyers. 
In addition to the model, some specific aspects seem to be of importance in 
order to get the product accepted by the category manager. The most 
important factor for getting a product accepted is that it can bring profits to 
the retailer (Park, 2001). Elg (2007) shows that even though retailers state 
liking to get consumer intelligence from the supplier, it is the price that 
matters. Skytte and Bove (2004) use the MEC approach to study the 
concept of retail value. Retail value is associated with the retailer 
interpreting the consumers’ needs. Danish and German retailers believe that 
the most important attributes related to pork products are sufficient 
quantities, good perceived product quality, consistent quality, wide product 
range, national supplier, good producer reputation, long-term orientation in 
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the relationship, low-cost price, and traceability of the product (Skytte and 
Bove, 2004). The consequences are a desire to supply what is believed to be 
demanded, assurance of repeat purchases by consumers, improvement of 
perceived consumer satisfaction, good image and increased competitiveness. 
The important values are sales, profit, growth and survival of the chain.  
It has been shown that the assortment offered affects consumers’ choices 
(Sloot and Verhoef, 2008; Simonson, 1999). The retailer should provide a 
constant assortment, because changes affect consumer satisfaction and 
purchasing behavior. In addition, retailers can apply a single or a multiple 
sourcing strategy. Stores using single sourcing accept paying higher prices to 
suppliers as they value consistency of assortment (Swift, 1995). Retailers 
preferring single sourcing rather than multiple sourcing use different 
manufacturer selection criteria,  for example they regard dependability as 
being more important than the multiple sourcing retailers do. The latter 
regard low price as being important. The single sourcing retailer perceives 
technical assistance to be important and puts more emphasis on product 
reliability. It has to be noted that the retailer foresees a risk of becoming 
dependent on a focal supplier. Many difficulties can follow from focal 
supplier opportunism, such as lower performance of the retailer and militant 
behavior by non-focal suppliers (Morgan et al., 2007). 
The dependability also emphasizes the importance of the relationship 
between the category manager and the supplier. The relationship is further 
enhanced by the category manager liking a constant assortment and having a 
long-term orientation related to assortment strategy (Skytte and Bove, 
2004). Bengtsson et al. (2000) concluded that the more suppliers a retailer 
has access to, the more it reduces its purchases from its old suppliers. At the 
same time, the collaboration with the old suppliers becomes more 
important. This is true both for the retailer’s main and complementary 
suppliers. The collaboration with suppliers does not decrease as the access to 
new products and suppliers within a product area increases. A larger 
number of suppliers implies that old suppliers are trying to adapt more to 
the retailer. 
The choice of supplier is crucial for the retail buyer. Different aspects of 
producer characteristics matter in the retailer’s dealings with the producer. 
The producer can benefit from brand equity, but also from trade equity 
acquired through being a trustworthy partner in inter-organizational 
exchanges (Davis and Mentzer, 2008).  
Pellegrini and Zanderighi (1991) concluded that previously used 
suppliers have a better chance of getting their new products accepted than 
suppliers that have not been used before. Newness and quality always seem   36 
to be important determinants for the retail buyer’s actual choice of product 
(Hansen and Skytte, 1998).  
The decision situation will be different depending on whether the 
product is a re-buy or a first time purchase for the retailer. Johansson (2002) 
suggests that the purchase of new products is a strategic decision that 
involves extensive information searches, both regarding market trends and 
consumer behavior. In contrast, re-buy decisions are based on internal 
information.  
4.4  Paper IV: ‘The reasons behind the demutualization of a meat 
marketing cooperative – the case of Swedish Meats’ 
The results from Paper IV indicate that Swedish Meats was demutualised 
because it could not offer competitive prices for the members’ products. 
The reason for this seems to be the problems of VDPR increasing the 
internal transaction costs for the members, making it too costly to efficiently 
govern the organization compared with trading with IOFs. The interviews 
with the key stakeholders revealed that the cooperative was offering lower 
prices that the IOFs, causing members’ trust in the cooperative to decline to 
the point where it was no longer considered disloyal to trade with an IOF, 
but rather good business sense. This made it easier for many members to 
leave the cooperative. The cooperative then ended up with inefficient 
operations, not being able to reap the benefit of the economies of scale. 
Data relating to the Swedish pork industry suggest that the decline in 
number of pigs and pig farmers has affected Swedish Meats to a larger extent 
than the other slaughterhouses. 
According to the interviewees, the members perceived the cooperative 
to be too large and complex, making it hard for the member representatives 
to monitor and control the management. There was reported to be no 
quality assurance in the organization and no flexibility, compared with the 
IOFs. The members and elected representatives perceived that they only 
received the information that the management wanted them to have. This 
increased the agency costs and worsened the control problem. In addition, as 
the representatives were full-time farmers, they were unable to involve 
themselves in all complex issues. They lacked knowledge regarding markets 
and product development, strategically important issues for the cooperative. 
To worsen the control problem, the members did not perceive all of the 
representatives to be competent, increasing the agency costs. The members 
found the whole structure of the cooperative too complex and they felt 
themselves unable to monitor the performance of the representatives or of   37 
management. The members were weak as owners and afraid of conflicts. 
They continuously demanded changes to improve the profitability of the 
cooperative, but they never followed up on whether the management or 
the representatives fulfilled their promises. A culture of management and 
influential representatives involved in mutual backscratching emerged.  
There were also problems relating to the influence cost problem. The 
interviewees state that members who were critical of the existing running of 
the cooperative were silenced. It was perceived that representatives were 
sometimes elected for the wrong reasons. Some of them were charismatic 
rather than competent for the task at hand. Too much politics were 
involved in the decisions, e.g. saving meat plants in the representatives’ own 
districts, etc. The representatives wanted to be popular. They raised the 
prices for the members’ products even though the cooperative was not 
really in a financial position to do so. They did not discuss the strategic 
questions that really mattered for the long-term ability to pay a good price 
for the members’ animals. On top of that, the cooperative had no strong 
leader that could make up for the heterogeneity of the members and that 
could make and communicate unpopular but strategically necessary 
decisions to all the members.  
The larger members had more to lose from the cooperative’s inefficient 
operations. Therefore they put more effort into monitoring and controlling 
the cooperative and ensuring that the smaller members voted according to 
their interests. This created a portfolio problem, as the smaller farmers might 
not have had the same risk preference. 
The  free-rider problem  became severe for the cooperative, as the low 
profitability of the cooperative and the small profits returned to members as 
patronage refund resulted in low member loyalty. The low performance by 
the cooperative in the past discouraged members from investing in it, 
resulting in a vicious circle where essential investments were not 
undertaken. The members took advantage of the existing situation without 
contributing. In addition, the decreased loyalty resulted in many members 
trading with IOFs, further lowering the profitability of the cooperative due 
to lack of economies of scale. The members took advantage of the 
cooperative being a yardstick for the competition, without contributing to 
it.  
The members and management also focused on short-term investments 
to streamline slaughter. No long-term investments in marketing and 
product development were undertaken, leading to difficulties in sales. There 
was no money for these investments. The members were engaged in the 
cooperative for the benefit of their farm, not the long-term survival of the   38 
cooperative. There was a horizon problem. This prevented long-term 
investments in marketing and product development, as the farmers wanted 
the profits as patronage refunds rather than invested in the cooperative. The 
result was demutualization of the cooperative.   39 
5   Analysis  
5.1  The cause of demutualization 
Our starting hypothesis as to why the dominant supplier of pork in Sweden, 
the Swedish Meats cooperative, demutualized in 2007 was that its members 
no longer perceived that they were receiving benefits that exceeded the 
costs associated with dealing with the cooperative. This hypothesis was 
verified by Paper IV. The cooperative suffered from low profitability and 
the members were unable to reverse this trend due to the existence of 
ownership problems related to the VDPR. One reason for low profitability 
can be poor market orientation. This thesis use one external and one 
internal perspective of market orientation.  
The internal perspective of achieving market orientation is that the 
owners of the business need to interpret customer demands correctly and 
develop appropriate strategies. The external perspective provides an 
explanation founded on the market intelligence. Attributes differentiate 
products in the minds of the consumers. Therefore, actors in a supply chain 
should understand the attributes that are relevant for their segment. For a 
processing firm such as Swedish Meats, two customers need to be kept in 
focus, the end-consumer and the retailer, the latter being the gate-keeper to 
the end-consumer. Thus, there was a need for Swedish Meats to have an 
understanding of the demands of both customer categories.  
5.2  External perspective of consumer adaptation 
Food purchasing is generally a low involvement decision (Costa et al., 
2004). Thus, purchasing pork is a rather routine behavior. The Swedish 
consumers of differently labeled pork examined here were found to use   40 
different cues when choosing which pork to buy (Paper I). Consumers of 
imported pork had a low level of involvement and bought the cheapest 
pork. Price had some influence for consumers of other kinds of pork too, 
but they also attached some value added to the products. The attribute 
‘Swedish’ was important to them, particularly consumers choosing pork 
produced by Swedish  Meats  and bearing the label ‘Scan’. This attribute 
seemed to be more important to the consumers than the brand of the pork, 
leading to the following questions: 
 
What implications did consumer attitudes to differently labeled pork have for the 
market orientation and profitability of Swedish Meats? 
 
As Paper I shows, Swedish Meats had clearly communicated that consumers 
should choose Swedish meat and consumers seemed to respond to this. 
However,  Swedish Meats  was not as successful in communicating the 
benefits of its brand, which is essential for the performance of an 
agribusiness firm (Hanf and Kühl, 2005). The consumers purchasing Scan- 
labeled pork associated the quality of the pork primarily with being 
Swedish. However, the importance of the attribute Swedish was exploitable 
by other producers, who could free-ride on the efforts that Swedish Meats 
had put into promoting the value added of Swedish production. While 
promoting Swedish meat or ‘Swedishness’ was in line with what the 
cooperative Swedish Meats had to do to increase the benefits of its members, 
it enabled IOFs to also take advantage of this marketing drive.  
Another factor influencing consumer choice was the price of the 
product. Finding cheap meat was important to the consumers purchasing 
imported and unbranded pork. Thus, the higher price of Scan-labeled pork 
might have restricted sales volumes and prohibited retail acceptance of Scan 
products (Park, 2001). This further emphasizes the importance of branding 
and pursuing a value-adding, differentiation strategy if unable to compete 
on price. 
 
What implications did the situational context of the consumer purchasing decision 
have for the market orientation and profitability of Swedish Meats? 
 
Paper II showed that at the PoP, situational factors were probably more 
influential for consumer choice than motivational structures regarding the 
product, retrieved at a later point in time. The display of the pork proved to 
be essential, as indicated by the importance attributed to choosing the first 
pork the consumer came across. The appearance of the pork also influenced   41 
the actual decision, as did having the right type or cut of pork available in 
the brand. If not, consumers would choose pork of a different brand (Sloot 
and Verhoef, 2008). This part of consumer adaptation calls for a large 
assortment, something that can be costly and resource-demanding.  
These practical aspects influencing consumer choice are difficult to 
control by a supplier, since they are decided by the retailer’s category 
manager. Thus, it is important to have a good relationship with the retail 
category manager (Skytte and Bove, 2004).  
Again, the situational aspects of consumer choice can possibly be 
somewhat overruled using branding. In the HVM for branded pork, 
situational aspects such as ‘the first I came across’ were less important than 
for unbranded pork. Again, this indicates the need for successful branding in 
order to get consumers to choose the product even when it is not being 
favored by the situational factors. 
 
What implications did the demands of the retail category manager have for the market 
orientation and profitability of Swedish Meats? 
 
The increased centralization of the retail sector has caused the distance 
between farmer and end-consumer to increase, preventing the farmer from 
getting access to accurate information regarding consumer needs 
(Hernàndez-Espallardo and Arcas-Lario, 2003). The retailer likes to make a 
profit on the products sold either directly or indirectly, e.g. by using it to 
attract customers to the store (Park, 2001; Loxbo, 2009). Thus, there is a 
focus on the profit margin of the products being offered. At the same time, 
consumers like to get a low price, which the retailer communicates to the 
supplier. Much of the market information available  to the producer is 
delivered by the retailer. Due to the information asymmetry of consumer 
demand, the retailer can act opportunistically towards the producer 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). This involves exaggerating the importance of 
some product features to serve the interests of the retailer rather than those 
of the consumer, such as the demand for low-price pork. This is supported 
by findings of Elg (2007) that retailers claim to like getting consumer 
intelligence upon which to base their purchasing decisions, but in practice 
ask for money and cheap labor to accept the product.  
It has been shown that retailers try to avoid focal supplier opportunism 
(Morgan et al., 2007). In the present case, that implies that retailers have 
encouraged competitors of Swedish Meats. They may even have been willing 
to give these competing firms more favorable terms in order to secure access 
to more than one supplier of Swedish meat, especially since attribute   42 
‘Swedish’ was very important for consumer choice (Paper I). Giving more 
favorable conditions to Swedish competitors would have resulted in Swedish 
Meats not getting as much pork accepted for sale in retail stores as they 
should have, given that their large size and dominant position enabled them 
to gain economies of scale, resulting in lower consumer prices. Favorable 
treatment of the competitors would thus have resulted in Swedish Meats 
having to lower their prices even further, decreasing the profitability of the 
firm. This is supported by findings by Bengtsson et al. (2000) showing that 
as retailers get access to more suppliers, they reduce their purchases from 
their previous suppliers, who are then forced to become more adaptive to 
retailer demands. However, the retail assortment needs to be consistent in 
order for the retailer not to lose sales from customers failing to find the 
required product (Simonson, 1999; Sloot and Verhoef, 2008). Therefore, 
there would still have been room for Swedish Meats products. Retailers like 
to purchase from a previous supplier with whom that they have built a 
relationship (Esbjerg and Skytte, 1999; Davis and Mentzer, 2008). In such 
cases the retailer knows what the products are like and that the supplier can 
meet retailer demands.  
It is more likely that Swedish Meats  could have got new products 
accepted if the products were perceived as new, of high quality and 
bringing a value at large to the category (Rao and McLauren, 1989; Hansen 
and Skytte, 1998; Johansson, 2002). Thus, it is import to undertake 
continuous product development in order to get products accepted by the 
retailer, something that proved problematic for Swedish Meats. A product 
has to be perceived as new and unique in order to be preferred when 
competitors are being treated favorably in relation to current product 
offerings.  
When retailers accept a new product, they are relying on information 
regarding consumer behavior (Johansson, 2002). Thus, it is important that 
the supplier has the right information about consumer demand. As retailers 
like to get marketing support from the suppliers in order to make sure that 
the consumers purchase the products offered, suppliers should develop a 
consumer pull for their products. This pull will encourage retailers to accept 
the product. 
5.3  Internal perspective of consumer adaptation 
The market conditions and the demands from end consumers and retailers 
need to be interpreted and taken into consideration by cooperative 
members when making strategic decisions regarding their business.   43 
Assuming that they have access to relevant market information, failure to 
adapt to the situation can only be explained by members failing to interpret 
it correctly and make the appropriate strategic decisions. The members have 
to undertake collective actions to meet the demands. 
 
How did Swedish Meats fail to be responsive to market intelligence, and why? 
 
Traditionally, the cooperative dealt with commodities, focusing on 
quantities, but the food market has become saturated with increased 
competition, increasing the importance of product quality and other value 
added  aspects (Hanf and Kühl, 2005). This poses challenges for 
cooperatives. In the present case, it is apparent that Swedish Meats had been 
successful in communicating to Swedish consumers that they should 
purchase Swedish meat. When a producer launches a marketing campaign 
of some sort, this puts pressure on the actors downstream in the supply 
chain. The scope of the campaign signals to the downstream actors that the 
producer is serious and believes in the product, affecting the decision of the 
downstream actors to accept the product (Mattson, 1969; Nilsson, 1980). 
This might have been part of the rationale behind the campaign to promote 
Swedish meat. More importantly, however, as a cooperative Swedish Meats 
served the interests of all Swedish animal farmers since they could all be 
members of the cooperative. The farmers could be regarded as a third 
market that the cooperative needed to serve, in addition to the consumer 
and retail markets. Thus, it is understandable that Swedish Meats  sent a 
marketing message satisfying the demand of the farmers, its present and 
potential future members. It is often argued that cooperatives are more 
product-orientated than market-orientated (Knutson, 1985). If the demands 
of the two stakeholders are not aligned, a conflict emerges.  
In farmer cooperatives, management is predominantly knowledgeable 
regarding production issues (Søgaard, 1994; Kyriakopoulos, 2000; Bond, 
2009). The reason for this is partly because recruitment is an internal 
process and partly because production knowledge is promoted at the 
expense of market knowledge. As a result, the management might be 
unable to make a correct analysis of the market and does not know what 
market-related knowledge is lacking within the organization. This agrees 
with Hardesty (2005), who reported that the user control of cooperatives, 
resulting in a lack of non-member representatives in the board of directors, 
suffers from a lack of expertise as the members are rather homogeneous 
regarding their skills. Furthermore, the interviews in Paper IV indicated that 
the members of Swedish Meats were not strong enough regarding replacing   44 
managers who failed to deliver on their promises. The members were afraid 
of conflicts and of being ‘black-listed’ in the Swedish cooperative sphere. 
There was a control problem in Swedish Meats. 
The production orientation of cooperatives also promotes investment in 
tangible assets rather than in intangibles. Cooperatives tend to invest in 
assets that are visible to their members. The interviews in Paper IV 
indicated a focus in Swedish Meats on streamlining the slaughter industry and 
improving payment systems, rather than product development and 
marketing. Assets that are included in the annual report were more likely to 
be acquired and approved by the members than investments in marketing 
and other intangible assets. The members’ lack of knowledge regarding 
product features, as well as of the consumer and retail market demands, 
further decreased investments in these intangibles.  
In order to create a market pull for their products cooperatives need to 
invest in marketing, which is a risky and long-term investment. In the case 
of  Swedish  Meats, product processing was an activity far from the 
cooperative members’ own farms. They did not have a lot of knowledge 
about these processes and the information asymmetry between the principal 
and the agent thereby increased. In such cases, the agency cost to safeguard 
that the agent undertakes these activities at a satisfactory level for the 
principal becomes high. Swedish Meats  members had more knowledge 
regarding the slaughter process, resulting in a focus on strategic issues related 
to the cooperative’s activities closer to the farmers’ own operations. There 
was thus a focus on streamlining the slaughter process instead of investing in 
marketing activities and product development (Paper IV). 
The  Swedish Meats  cooperative ended up in a situation where it 
undertook market push instead of pull. Instead of marketing and product 
development, activities that could have enabled the cooperative to create 
value added for its products and charge consumers accordingly, it focused 
on trying to cut costs. It was forced to compete using a price strategy 
instead of a differentiation strategy. A cost leader strategy is the most likely 
and suitable for a traditional cooperative operating close to farm activities, as 
it implies economies of scale (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007; Nilsson and 
Ollila, 2009). When seeking other strategies, such as product differentiation 
or a focus strategy, other cooperative models may be considered (Chaddad 
and Cook, 2004a).  
The effort by Swedish Meats to cut costs was encouraged by the retailers 
emphasizing consumer demand for cheap products. The strategy by the 
retailer of using multiple sourcing of Swedish meat, along with the lack of 
market pull for Swedish Meats products, resulted in low profitability for the   45 
cooperative. The cooperative could not offer to match the prices offered by 
other slaughterhouses. As a result, members left the cooperative and it 
began to suffer from excess capacity and could not achieve economies of 
scale. This made it even harder for it to compete on price. In addition, the 
cooperative could not prevent members from selling their animals to the 
cooperative, so it had to take on the costs of exporting meat when there 
was a surplus on the more lucrative Swedish market. Exportation ruled out 
the possibility of charging for the value added by domestic origin, further 
decreasing the profitability.  
Paper IV provides an explanation why the cooperative failed. The 
VDPR problems prevented members from making appropriate strategic 
decisions. Because of the free-rider problem, members took advantage of 
the cooperative’s competitive yardstick role and delivered elsewhere, instead 
of trying to improve the cooperative’s conditions. The control costs were 
perceived to be very high, as the cooperative was large and the information 
asymmetry between principal and agent increased. Being full-time farmers 
and not having a lot of knowledge about processing activities caused the 
members to focus on the area closest to them, the slaughter process, instead 
of controlling the agent’s efforts in marketing and product development. 
The influence cost problem caused the charismatic rather than the 
knowledgeable representatives sometimes being elected, worsening the state 
of strategic planning in the cooperative. The cooperative paid higher prices 
than it could afford and paid patronage refunds instead of undertaking the 
necessary investments in marketing and product development. These 
investments were associated with higher risks that the members were not 
willing to accept, hence a portfolio problem. Furthermore, the members 
focused on short-term investments, such as cost cuts in production, rather 
than long-term investments. This horizon problem arose as the members 
demanded short-term benefits, perhaps because they were discouraged by 
the poor results of the cooperative and foresaw leaving it in the near future.  
According to Hansmann (1988), cooperative members are the owners of 
the organization because they are the group that creates the lowest costs for 
all interested parties. As the members face large transaction costs prior to the 
existence of the cooperative, the total cost of transacting becomes lower 
after taking on the ownership costs of the cooperative, even though these 
are high. When the Swedish pork market was regulated, the cooperative 
arrangement functioned well. When the market was deregulated, 
competition increased and at the same time, more slaughter options became 
available. The competition resulted in lower sales volumes for Swedish Meats 
and alternative slaughterhouses emerged, competing to get the members’   46 
animals. Thus, the transaction costs experienced by the farmers decreased. 
At the same time, the ownership costs were high. In fact the costs were 
possibly so high that members chose to deliver their animals elsewhere 
instead of taking ownership responsibility and trying to find an efficient 
response to the changed market conditions. The members were then no 
longer the group of patrons that could create the lowest costs for all the 
interested parties. Hence, the cooperative demutualized.  
Another explanation can be found in the fact that cooperatives lack the 
management assessment instrument provided by the stock market. As 
cooperative shares are not tradable, the capital market does not help to 
evaluate the organization’s initiatives to be innovative and to respond to 
market intelligence. Thus, this has to be done solely by the cooperative 
members (Holmström, 1999). In IOFs, investors react and force the firm to 
take appropriate action. If the investors do not believe in the future of the 
firm, they will withdraw their capital. In the case of a cooperative this is a 
slower process, as the members have to discover these problems themselves. 
The only economic evaluation instrument to which they have access is the 
price the cooperative pays for their produce. The cooperative tries to keep 
this high for as long as possible, as this is what its members prioritize. 
Therefore, it can take some time before the impact of the lack of market 
orientation becomes apparent. In addition, as the members have previously 
not had to consider market issues to a large extent, because the market has 
been regulated, they do not have experience in market-related issues. The 
outcome is that they take cost-saving actions rather than launching activities 
promoting innovation and market orientation. Thus cooperatives tend to be 
producer-orientated rather than market-orientated (Staatz, 1984). As the 
profitability of the business becomes worse, the cost for members to use 
their voice in order to change the situation increases, and the exit option is 
chosen (Holmström, 1999).   47 
6  Discussion and conclusions 
6.1  How can cooperatives improve their market orientation? 
There are aspects of the cooperative structure that could be used in order to 
improve the market orientation. For instance, the cooperative could take 
advantage of its ability to trace products back to farm level (Skytte and 
Blunch, 2001). This is a feature of products demanded by retailers. As 
cooperatives control the production chain, they should be able to do this at 
a lower cost than competitors, which have to buy inputs and information 
regarding the products from external parties.  
Safety is another attribute found to be important to the consumer and 
the retailer. If the cooperative can manage to signal quality to the consumer, 
the information asymmetry can be reduced, resulting in reduced risks for 
the consumer (Hanf and Kühl, 2005). Again, controlling  the whole 
processing chain would ensure safe products. Consumers could learn to 
infer trust into cooperative products.  
Furthermore, the cooperative ownership structure can be used as a way 
to position products (Hardesty, 2005). Consumers have positive attitudes 
towards cooperatives (Nilsson et al., 2007). This attribute is therefore 
something that the cooperative could use in its marketing, preferably 
together with some other aspect, such as local production. A strategy to 
connect the member and consumers  and move from a product/price 
orientation to a value/experience orientation could possibly be successful 
(Hardesty, 2005). This trend is emerging in the Swedish dairy sector, where 
farmers invite consumers to attend when the cows are being let out for 
grazing for the summer season.  
However, in order to be able to undertake the market-orientated 
activities mentioned, risk capital needs to be attracted. Thus, increased   48 
market orientation might require a change of cooperative structure in order 
to avoid being hindered by the problems of VDPR. If they do not pursue 
this route, cooperatives should focus on their core competences, possibly 
being the supplier of bulk products to processors providing the final value-
added product (Hanf and Kühl, 2005) 
In order to overcome the problems resulting from VDPR, causing 
difficulties acquiring the capital needed to be successful following a 
differentiation or focus strategy, cooperatives should convert to 
entrepreneurial forms of cooperative structure with external co-owners or 
closed membership. Thus, Swedish Meats could possibly have avoided the 
problems of VDPR if it had converted to another cooperative model 
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004a; van Bekkum, 2001). However, Swedish Meats, 
organized as a traditional cooperative, instead tried to cut costs and 
differentiate its products to retain market share as competition increased.  
As Swedish Meats disappeared as a cooperative, there was turmoil among 
all the actors within the meat industry (Liang, 2009). The new owner, HK 
Scan, had to reduce the cost level substantially, which meant that several 
plants were closed down. It was necessary to reduce the excess capacity. In 
this situation, several slaughterhouses tried to expand their production 
capacity and actively recruited suppliers that previously delivered to Swedish 
Meats. In this turbulence, the major meat cooperative in Denmark, Danish 
Crown, acquired two slaughterhouse firms in Sweden, thereby further 
increasing the intensity of competition. Danish Crown seems to be 
successful  in its market orientation, enabling entrance on the Swedish 
market (Grunert et al., 2005).  
6.2  Contribution of the thesis and policy recommendations  
VDPR problems aggravate the difficulties in adapting to consumer demands 
by distorting the market signals in three ways. Firstly, the wrong signals are 
sent to the capital market, as the members are not interested in investing. 
Secondly, the input market is distorted as members free-ride and take 
advantage of the cooperative’s operations without contributing accordingly. 
Lastly, the market signals are twisted, as the wrong price level is signaled to 
the producers and poor corporate governance prevents relevant information 
flows in the organization. Thus, in order to get a functioning market, the 
problems of VDPR need to be addressed. 
These problems become paralyzing for the cooperative as markets 
saturate and competition increases. Thus, actions need to be taken to allow 
and encourage traditional cooperatives to transform into structures with   49 
more market-orientated characteristics. The cooperative has the possibility 
to acquire the risk capital necessary to continue providing a competitive 
yardstick role and thereby ensuring that farmers are not subject to 
opportunistic pricing. As the cooperative then becomes less open, the free-
riding of the yardstick effect can be counteracted. 
As shown in Paper I, even though purchasing pork is a low involvement 
product to which it is difficult to attach value added, there are differences 
between different kinds of pork. It is easier to attach value to branded pork, 
such as that produced by Swedish Meats, since this, along with 
locally/organically produced pork, was purchased by more involved 
consumers. That fact enables product differentiation on the most salient 
values for consumers to attain a profitable target market. For instance, 
producers should use the values associated with their products to improve 
the efficiency of their marketing. 
Paper II showed the importance of conducting consumer research at the 
PoP. It appeared that when asked about purchasing decisions outside the 
actual decision making context, the situational aspects of the choice were 
forgotten by consumers. The product choice was given more importance 
and consumers reported more deliberate action than may actually have been 
the case. Even though some aspects may have been lost when studying 
consumer decision-making at the PoP, these results may still be highly 
valid, as that loss is compensated for by the most salient aspects being 
reported. This aspect needs to be considered by practitioners and researchers 
when carrying out market analysis. 
The review of retail store category manager decision-making (Paper III) 
was important as it provided a model of the aspects that suppliers need to 
consider when trying to get their products accepted. This can be valuable to 
local producers and producers of other value-added products, who do not 
have the resources to undertake the same marketing campaigns to convince 
the retail buyer as larger producers have. Selling value added products in the 
retail store enables the producer to retrieve the production costs, which are 
higher than those facing foreign farmers. Thus, it is important to know the 
product aspects needed to get the product accepted, regardless of producer 
size. As the purchasing decision-making process of retail store category 
managers dealing with perishable goods had not been studied previously, 
Paper III makes a valuable contribution to the literature. 
Paper IV makes another important contribution as it provides an 
explanation why cooperatives might demutualize. It points out the 
importance of getting to grips with VDPR problems in order to ensure the 
survival of the cooperative. In short, the members have to become better   50 
owners. This can be achieved for instance by enabling them to spend more 
time governing their cooperative. This can be done by decreasing the 
administrate burden on farmers at farm level through complicated subsidy 
systems and animal welfare regulations. Paper IV also makes a theoretical 
contribution, as it merges VDPR problems with the TCE framework.  
In order for farmers to get the value added associated with Swedish 
production, the country of origin needs to be stated on the products. This 
will come about either through legislation or through market demand. If 
consumers are willing to pay value added for domestic production, this will 
be worth communicating on the products. It is already done for cut meat, 
but it is not mandatory for processed products.  
Market orientation is a process that has to be undertaken in the entire 
value chain. In order to be successful, there needs to be trust and openness 
between the parties, enabling dissemination of marketing intelligence. In 
the case of Swedish Meats, as indicated in Paper IV there was a lack of trust 
and openness in its relationship with the retailers. The members interviewed 
gave the impression that they perceived the retailer to have a much stronger 
position, hindering trust. The implications of this lack of cooperation in the 
value chain for the fulfillment of the end-consumers’ need to be considered. 
For example, it might prevent consumers from getting access to products 
that they are demanding, but do not yet know about.  
According to Grunert et al. (2005), a strong trade association is 
important in order to achieve an open and trusting value chain. The trade 
association should help in disseminating market intelligence. The role and 
impact of the trade associations therefore need to be considered by its 
members. As trade associations can have a role in ensuring trust, resources 
are needed to make this function as efficient as possible. 
To summarize, it is not easy to run a successful IOF. It can be argued 
that it is even more difficult to run a cooperative due to the VDPR 
problems. Members face a major challenge governing their organization in 
an increasingly competitive market. Involvement and learning are required 
if they are to be successful in their ownership role. Alternative cooperative 
structures suited for the changed market conditions and the growing need 
for investments may enable members to alleviate the problems of VDPR.    51 
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